Responding to the catastrophic destruction of the Fukushima nuclear powerplant in northern Honshu, Japan's main island, by the cascading tsunami/earthquake of 3 March 2011, Canada's nuclear regulator dispatched delegates to an international meeting at Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency.

Ramzi Jammal delivered the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission’s statement to the 5th Review Meeting for the IAEA's Convention on Nuclear Safety, 4–14 April 2011. CNSC circulated Jammal's presentation on 8 April 2011, as “an overview of Canada's response” to the Fukushima disaster.

This overview offers bullet points suggesting CNSC activities within “Canada’s response.” None of the bullet points contains the words “cause,” “explanation,” or “root cause,” which the international nuclear safety and radiation protection community usually studies after severe nuclear accidents like Chernobyl on 26 April 1986. Ramzi Jammal’s presentation does not even suggest Canada’s potential willingness to participate in the root cause analysis which a global “Convention on Nuclear Safety” would be expected to undertake post Fukushima.

Instead, Jammal’s overview lauds “Canada’s response to events in Japan,” comprising environmental monitoring, videoconferencing and other passive measures, and endorses CNSC licensee Atomic Energy of Canada Limited’s slogan “defence in depth.”

The Jammal presentation on page 17 enumerates almost verbatim the unique “Candu safety features” proclaimed by its licensees.

In marked contrast to CNSC’s current industry-friendly approach, the Uranium Institute published The Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: An Assessment by an international group of senior nuclear safety experts (London, UK 1988).

The Uranium Institute, later renamed The World Nuclear Association, discussed the 26 April 1986 explosions at unit 4 of the Chernobyl RBMK nuclear powerplant, and found:

“The direct cause of the accident was a series of deliberate violations of both operating procedures and good safety practice by the operators, exacerbated by the reactor’s inherently unstable design.” (p50);

“At low power levels the RBMK’s power coefficient is positive.” (p51);

“The shortcomings of the design assume grave significance only when coupled with inadequate safety management.” (p52);

“A reactor design should include an independent, dedicated system, capable on its own of shutting down the reactor rapidly from any power level. A reactor system should be designed to stop operating at unstable power states automatically and should not rely only on operating rules to avoid inherently unsafe regimes.” (p54)

Even given CNSC’s will to analyze the 3/11 Fukushima catastrophe, Canadian presenter Ramzi Jammal may lack the scientific and industrial qualifications to join such explanatory, cause-and-effect conversations on the Fukushima nuclear disaster. Current CNSC biographical data on Jammal credits him only with Bachelor of Science and Master of Business Administration degrees. Moreover, Jammal has never held an academic or high administrative post, according to CNSC.

Neither the CNSC 8 April 2011 communiqué nor CNSC's “Executive Committee” biography of Ramzi Jammal states his scientific or professional qualifications to serve as Canada's “Chief Nuclear Regulatory Officer.”

The CNSC's capability to safeguard Canada's nuclear plants was grievously compromised by the Harper government's abrupt dismissal of former CNSC CEO Linda Keen.

Green Party of Canada leader Elizabeth May on 1 April 2011 described Ms. Keen’s background:

“I'm pleased to invite you here today for an opportunity to discuss with a very valiant and courageous woman who dedicated her life to public service and I think was treated very shabbily but I'm very honored that Linda Keen the former president of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission and a woman who headed up international work to review nuclear safety has been willing to appear with me in this election campaign to explain why she supports me in this campaign to become the first elected member of parliament for the Green Party.”

“Linda and I came to know each other in the events surrounding the decision of the Harper government and particularly of the incumbent for Saanich Gulf-Islands the Minister of Natural Resources Garry Lunn in removing her from the presidency of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission over an issue of nuclear safety. In the context of the ongoing crisis in Japan in Fukushima the ongoing and continually uncontrollable and we're still wondering what the end point will be of that disaster. But the beginning of that disaster had certain elements in common with the issue over which Linda was fired. We all I hope recall the Chalk river reactor the NRU reactor was operating in violation of its license from the CNSC. When that was discovered and CNSC insisted that the licensee AECL live up to the terms of its safety license which required a back-up system for its power in the event of an earthquake…”

“ This is right on point to what we see happening in Japan and Linda was treated not just personally shabbily, but the decision to fire her, as Auditor General Sheila Fraser said at the time, had a chilling effect through the entire civil service. It did damage to the fundamental concept of the relationship between independent regulators and governments that appoint them and count on them to live up to their requirement to protect us whether we're talking about food safety, nuclear safety, water pollution. We cannot in this country have regulators who are afraid to regulate for fear heads will roll if they offend their political masters. This did violence to our regulatory system in Canada and with that I just say how courageous that was. Linda is courageous, valiant, and absolutely steadfast in her commitment to proper regulation in fulfilling her role as a civil servant…”

The ACTivist pinpointed the untrustworthy role of Gary Lunn when CNSC professional inspectors warned against the earthquake vulnerability of the upper Ottawa River Valley

Harper's cabinet forced Bill C-38 through a nocturnal parliament with “all-party assent” on 12 December 2009 removing CNSC regulation from AECL’s NRU reactor in the valley.

We reported earlier in Electricity Daily doubts among leading academic geophysicists whether Canada’s nuclear plants can withstand earthquakes (28 March 2005).